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1.  Introduction 
 Perception is usually understood on a descriptive model:  in perceiving, it is said, 
we picture the world.  I would like to introduce, by contrast, a notion of perceptual 
normativity, a notion that, I believe, characterizes perception in its most fundamental 
form.  To understand perception as essentially normative, we will see, requires an 
unusual understanding both of ourselves and of the world.  This understanding 
emphasizes our receptive capacities over our spontaneous ones, and locates a 
fundamental kind of human freedom in our capacity to resist the world’s authority over 
us, rather than in our capacity to act as independent and self-legislating agents in it.  
Though unusual, this understanding is not unprecedented.  It finds echoes in the 
phenomenological accounts of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, for 
example, at least if these are understood in a certain way.  The main goal of this paper, 
however, is not to defend such an exegetical claim.  Rather, I would like to develop and 
defend the notion of perceptual normativity itself, occasionally referring to the work of 
these philosophers and others to do so, and to highlight some of the unusual aspects of 
ourselves and the world that this notion of perceptual normativity encourages us to 
accept. 
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On the surface, perhaps, the idea of perceptual normativity is simple enough:  we 
know what perception is, more or less, and we know what norms are, more or less, so 
how could we not know what perceptual normativity is?  It must be a kind of norm that 
applies to perception.  But in introducing the notion of perceptual normativity I will be 
using neither the term “perception” nor the term “normativity” in its usual sense.   
 
In contemporary philosophical usage the term “perception” refers to a perceptual 
experience.  When understood in this way a perception is identified, at least to a first 
approximation, by its qualitative feel - by what it’s like, in Thomas Nagel’s phrase, to be 
a perceiver undergoing the experience in question.  Canonical examples of perception on 
this view are the experience of redness, or the experience of pain.  Their is a pure 
qualitative aspect to these experiences, it is said, that identifies them as experiences of the 
sort they are.  Now, not all contemporary philosophers believe that in the end it is right to 
say that perceptions actually have this purely qualitative aspect to them; some believe, for 
example, that the putative “raw feel” of an experience can be explained in 
representational terms.1  But the going understanding of a perception is nevertheless as 
something that seems to have a pure qualitative aspect to it, even if this can be explained 
away. 
 
By contrast, I will understand by the term “perception” something much broader 
than an essentially inner and qualitative experience.  As I understand it, perceiving is a 
                                                
1 See Harman, Tye, Byrne, and other “representationalists.” 
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subject’s general way of taking account of the world, especially in the context of his 
skillful activity within it.  On this view perception is closer to what Heidegger calls 
Umsicht, or circumspection; literally a kind of “looking around.” (???)  The phrase 
“looking around” is misleading, though, since it could indicate that a subject is looking 
around for something, and that in doing so he has a series of qualitative experiences that 
either match or fail to match the thing he hopes to find; as, for example, when one looks 
around for one’s keys.  This is certainly a kind of perception, but it is not what Heidegger 
has in mind for the phenomenon of Umsicht, nor what I will take as the most basic case 
of perception.  A better example is the way one takes account of the environment when 
one avoids people and other obstacles in walking along a sidewalk or down a path.  One 
can do this while looking around for the obstacles, the way one looks around for one’s 
keys.  But in the most basic cases one takes the environment into account in a much less 
deliberate and attentive way.  Far from involving an infallibly present qualitative feel, 
therefore, perception as I understand it occurs primarily when one doesn’t even notice it 
at all.   
 
My use of the term “normativity” will be similarly unusual.  As traditionally 
understood norms are external rules against which one measures one’s behavior.  They 
are like the Roman builder’s square (in Latin norma) or his straight edge (in Latin 
regula), the terms from which our words “normativity” and “rule” are derived.  A norm 
or a rule, on this traditional conception, exists prior to and independently of one’s 
activity, the way a square or a straight edge exists independently of the line or angle one 
draws with it.  When one performs a normatively regulated activity, then, one constantly 
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compares the norm and the activity against which it is measured to ensure that the one 
conforms to the other. A good example of this kind of normativity occurs when a new 
law is passed.  When airports outlawed the possession of nail clippers on planes, for 
instance, I experienced the new law as a norm of this external type.  I constantly had to 
remind myself of the law as I was preparing for a trip, continually placing it before me 
and paying attention to it, in order to ensure that my activity conformed to it.  I 
experienced the law as something independent of my activity and against which to 
measure its success. 
 
By contrast with this traditional view of norms, I will understand a norm as that 
from which one immediately feels oneself to be deviating – to a greater or lesser extent – 
in performing the activity regulated by it.  The norm is not experienced as an independent 
measure against which to compare the activity, on this view.  Rather, an essential aspect 
of the activity is that one immediately feels compelled to perform it in a way that, in 
Merleau-Ponty’s words, lessens a certain tension.  When in having a conversation with 
someone, for example, the person stands too close, one immediately finds oneself 
backing away in order to make the situation less uncomfortable.  There is no pre-existing 
sense of an appropriate distance at which to stand, as there was a pre-existing existing 
sense of the new law about nail clippers.  Rather, part of what constitutes this as an act of 
having a conversation of a certain type just is that I immediately feel motivated to 
respond to the situation by stepping back.  
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When I say that perception, in its most fundamental form, is characterized by a 
kind of normativity, then, I mean that perception as a kind of skillful taking account of 
the environment is characterized by an immediate motivation to lessen tensions that the 
situation presents.  When a subject is motivated immediately by environmental norms in 
this way, as happens in our most basic kinds of skillful coping activities, she has a 
peculiarly intimate relation with the world.  I am tempted to say that these kinds of basic 
perceptually guided activities bind us to or give us direct contact with the world.  This 
terminology reflects that of disjunctive theorists about perception like John McDowell 
and Michael Martin.  But the metaphor here is phenomenologically misleading.  For the 
binding metaphor indicates that perceiver and world are independent entities that need to 
be glued together, the way Russell thought subject and predicate need to be glued 
together in creating a unified proposition.  As Russell discovered, though, the problem 
how two independent entities can be glued together to create a single, unified whole is 
apparently unsolvable, and in any case it does not account for the phenomenology of 
perceptual normativity.  Another metaphor for the relation between perception and world 
comes from Merleau-Ponty.  In his late work Merleau-Ponty says that there is an 
intertwining of perceiver and world.  But this metaphor suffers from the same kind of 
problem, as if perceiver and world were each independent strands of a rope that somehow 
get wrapped around one another.  The phenomenological facts demand a stronger image 
than this.  The best that I can think of is that in fundamental perception perceiver and 
world exist in solution with one another, the way salt can exist in solution with water.  
We dissolve into the world in fundamental perception, manifesting its norms immediately 
in our activity, and in so doing affecting the very norms of which the world is made.  But 
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we are not always in this intimate state.  Our particular human freedom, I will argue, 
consists in our ability to come out of this kind of solution, crystallizing, as it were, both 
self and world.  In what follows I will try to highlight some of the phenomenological 
features of our normative directedness by the world and the freedom we have to break the 
world’s hold on us.   
 
 
2.  Freely choosing to be bound by the world 
 
 In fundamental perception, our taking account of the world in skillfully and 
absorbedly coping in it, we are, to use Heidegger’s phrase from Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics, bound by the world.  As I understand it, being bound by the world is a 
matter of being immediately motivated to respond to its solicitations.  The worldly 
environment, in other words, is a normative environment – I immediately experience it in 
terms of how well it allows me to engage in my activities.  Take the case of perceiving 
colors, one of my favorite examples.  We never see a color without already seeing it in 
some lighting context or other, and I have to take account of the lighting context in order 
to see the color as any color at all.  In what way, though, does our perception take 
account of lighting?  As Merleau-Ponty says, we experience the lighting context 
normatively – the lighting leads my gaze to the place where it is best for seeing the color.  
I take the lighting into account, in other words, by finding myself immediately motivated 
to move my eyes over here to see the color well.  If this account is right, then there is a 
kind of normative self-referentiality to perceptual experience.  In seeing a color my 
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perception involves not only an experience of what color it is, but also an experience of 
how this very perception of the color could be improved.  Even in the simple act of 
seeing colors, therefore, perception is bound by the normative structure of the 
environment.  I have talked about this kind of normativity elsewhere (in “Seeing Things 
in Merleau-Ponty”), so I will not say more about it here. 
 
 So far, this kind of normativity looks to be something we share with animals.  
After all, animals must see constant colors in the environment also, and they must do so 
by taking account of the lighting context.  But Heidegger emphasizes an essential 
difference between us and animals, and I think he’s got something importantly right in 
his discussion of this.  In particular, Heidegger claims that whereas animals are simply 
bound by the environment, we “freely hold ourselves open to be bound.”  There is an 
important question what this free choice amounts to.  Let me try to give an account. 
 
 The main difference between us and animals is that we can resist our motivation 
to respond to the environment in a way that animals cannot.  Our freedom, then, consists 
always in letting ourselves be bound, simply because whenever we are bound by the 
environment it is a result of our not having resisted it.  By contrast with Kant, then, 
Heidegger’s is a kind of negative freedom – a freedom to resist what we are drawn to do.  
Our spontaneity acts for Heidegger as a check on our immediately motivated response to 
the environment, instead of creating from whole cloth, as with Kant, an act in the 
environment, though an act that is subject to the constraints of the moral law.  The key 
thing about us, then, the most basic, and magic act of the free and spontaneous will of 
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which we are capable, is our capacity to resist the world’s hold upon us.  To take an 
example, I can, in the midst of being immediately motivated to walk to the kitchen and 
make a cup of tea, nevertheless resist this motivation and decide instead to keep working 
at the computer.  This capacity to resist what the world solicits us to do seems to me an 
essential feature of the way we experience perceptual norms. 
 
 Now, there are two interesting facts about the phenomenology of resistance.  The 
first is that in order to resist the motivation to act in a certain way one must notice that 
one is so motivated. After all, how is one to resist a solicitation to act that one doesn’t 
even recognize?  To resist something, in other words, it must be something that one can 
identify, for otherwise it is nothing that one can stand against.  To return to our example, I 
cannot resist the immediate motivation to walk into the kitchen to make a cup of tea, 
unless I first notice that I am motivated to do just that.  Or to take an example from 
childhood, to resist the immediate motivation to run across the street without looking, one 
first needs to notice that that is what one is motivated to do.  Indeed, learning to act 
properly in all kinds of social situations requires not merely that one be drawn by the 
environment to act – a requirement that is satisfied even by animals – but also that one 
notice in what ways one is being so drawn.   
 
 But now, there is a second interesting fact.  For having noticed the solicitation to 
act, something else immediately follows.  Namely, noticing the solicitation is itself 
sufficient to break its motive force.  That’s because when you are being solicited by the 
environment to act, there is no thing that you experience as the source of the solicitation. 
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I am drawn-immediately-to-go-through, in Heidegger’s example from the Logic lectures, 
but it is wrong to say that I experience the door as the thing that is drawing me.  Once 
there is a door in my experience, I am lost.  For to experience some thing as the source of 
a solicitation is no longer immediately to be motivated to act.  In short, because noticing a 
solicitation reifies it, noticing therefore breaks its motive force.  In a slogan:  a 
solicitation and its source cannot be experienced simultaneously.  The situation is similar 
to that of Frege’s unsaturated concepts:  once we turn the solicitation into some thing that 
solicits, it’s no longer what it was when it joined environment and absorbed agent in a 
unified whole.  (Also similar to MP’s example of one hand touching the other:  either the 
hand is experienced as an object or as a body-subject, but not both.) 
 
 With this, then, we have the sketch of a pretty big story on the table.  It begins 
with the Heideggerean claim that our freedom consists in our ability to resist the 
immediate solicitation to act in the environment.  From here it focuses on the 
phenomenology of resisting immediate solicitations to act.  Resisting the solicitation to 
act requires noticing that one is being so solicited.  Noticing this is noticing either the 
solicitation (which reifies it as a source) or the motivation (which reifies it as a willful 
desire).  Either of these reifying moves – or crystallizing acts, in the terminology of the 
introduction – has the consequence of breaking the immediate hold of the environment on 
the absorbed agent.  So noticing a solicitation is both a requirement for resistance and 
constitutive of it.   
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Furthermore, this account of our freedom to resist being bound by the world also 
explains how perception opens the possibility for thought.  For once the environmental 
solicitation is reified as a source or the motivation as a willful desire, these no longer 
normative powers but entities about which one can think.  So learning to resist 
solicitations to act – which is after all what is required for indoctrination into a social 
realm – itself enables thought about entities as the source of solicitations and about 
willful desires as the source of motivations.  Both of these kinds of thoughts essentially 
miss the phenomenon of absorbed agency because of a kind of cover-up.  For the very 
thing that is required for thinking about ourselves and the world – namely, resisting the 
motivation to act by noticing it – that very act of noticing transforms what is noticed into 
something other than the normative power it was when it was immediately motivating us 
to act.  So by starting with a kind of minimal and negative account of our freedom as the 
capacity to resist the world, one can generate a whole story not only about the difference 
between us and animals but also about the relation between perception and thought.  I 
don’t take myself to have told this story in any kind of detail here, of course, but 
hopefully its contours will at least be recognizable. 
 
 
3.  Kant vs. Heidegger on Freedom and Norms 
 
 I have talked about the distinction between a solicitation and its source; and we 
have seen briefly also that there is an analogous distinction between a motivation and a 
willful desire.  In short, environmental solicitations and agential motivations cannot, even 
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in principle, be noticed.  For to notice a solicitation or a motivation is to turn it into an 
entity that solicits or motivates, and to do this is ipso facto to strip its motive force.  Here 
is a way, then, in which the phenomenological story differs from Kant’s story about the 
norms of the moral law.  For Kant, one would not even count as a self-legislating agent 
unless one actively chose to act in relation to the moral law.  Only because the agent 
spontaneously wills his activity does he have a chance of counting as a self-legislated 
agent.  An animal who as a matter of fact performs all and only those actions that accord 
with the moral law would not count as a moral agent unless he in addition performed 
them because they accorded with the moral law.  But one cannot choose to perform an 
action because it accords with the moral law unless one first knows what the action is, 
then knows what the moral law requires, and finally can judge that the first and the 
second stand in accord.  Kant’s view of normativity, in other words, squarely recalls the 
Roman model.  So the phenomenological and the Kantian view have sharply contrasting 
accounts of the normativity of agency.  On the phenomenological account an action is 
normatively motivated only when the agent fails to notice that it is; for Kant, by contrast, 
one must pay attention to one’s actions in order for them to count as legislated actions at 
all. 
 
 How sharp, really, is this divide?  Perhaps one reason for thinking it is not quite as 
sharp as I have suggested is this:  Kant seems not to be interested in the broad question 
whether an action is motivated but rather in the narrower question whether it is self-
legislated.  So although it is true that Kant and the phenomenologist each has a different 
role for noticing, this is because they are interested in different phenomena:  motivation 
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and legislation are not the same thing.  This observation is accurate but fails to put the 
issue in its proper context.  For at a more general level Heidegger and Kant are interested 
in the very same phenomena:  they are both interested in questions about autonomy and 
human freedom.  And here, although there is a broad similarity, in detail they do have 
sharply different things to say.   
 
To begin with the broad similarity:  both Heidegger and Kant believe we are 
condemned to be free.  For Heidegger the case in which I am genuinely motivated to act, 
although in a certain sense a case in which I cede authority to the environment, is 
nevertheless a case of real human freedom.  This is not because I fail to pay attention to 
what I’m doing in such a case, but because I am the type of animal that could have paid 
attention had I chosen to.  (Or at any rate am the type of animal to whom it could have 
been given that I pay attention, since noticing is not something that I can do.) For 
Heidegger, then, my action is always free in the sense that it is always properly 
understood as one that, though perhaps solicited by the environment, I nevertheless 
allowed to occur.  Kant has a version of this as well.  On his view, whether I choose to 
act in accord with the moral law or in abrogation of it my act is free; and free for the very 
reason that I am the type of animal that has the choice. For Kant, therefore, my action is 
free in the sense that it is always properly understood as one that flows from or 
contravenes the moral law. 
 
Despite this broad similarity, however, the choices an agent makes are different in 
the phenomenological and the Kantian case.  For Kant I can choose either to break or 
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accede to the moral law.  In both of these cases I am making a spontaneous, willful 
choice, one that I need to notice in order to chose.  It is true that either of these 
spontaneous choices is properly understood as the act of a self-legislating agent.  For I am 
an autonomous, self-legislating agent not in the sense that I choose only lawful actions, 
but rather in the sense that I always understand my actions in terms of their lawfulness or 
lack thereof.  But for Kant the essential point here is that both of these are actions that I 
know myself to make.  On the phenomenological account, by contrast, my choice is 
different.  According to the phenomenologist, either I choose to resist a solicitation or I 
fail to choose to resist it.  The second of these is not a spontaneous, willful choice of the 
sort Kant was interested in, but rather the absence of such a choice.  Once again, the 
Kantian move is made:  for whether I choose or fail to choose the path of resistance, I 
will properly be understood as an agent whose act is free.  But for the phenomenologist 
the essential point is that knowing myself as the agent of the act is not required.   
 
 Notice that there is a funny reversal of positions here.  Kant, in trying to show that 
the moral agent is a self-legislator, emphasizes how much the moral law itself is the cause 
of his actions.  I would not count as a moral, self-legislating agent for Kant, unless I 
performed my actions because they were demanded by the moral law.  Heidegger, by 
contrast, is trying to establish the world as a basic motive force.  In doing so, however, he 
emphasizes that it is only because I freely allow it to effect me that there is anything like a 
genuine world at all.  For after all animals are world-poor, as Heidegger says, and that is 
precisely because they lack the freedom to allow the environment to effect them in the 
first place.  So Kant, who is trying to establish the authority of the self, ends up ceding it 
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to the moral law, whereas Heidegger, who is trying to establish the authority of the world, 
ends up grounding it ultimately in the agent’s autonomy.  Not exactly the way you’d have 
expected it.  The story gets even funnier when we realize that for Heidegger the agent’s 
autonomy is really not his own anyway.  I’ll conclude with this difficult point. 
 
4.  Human Freedom versus Worldly Breakdown 
 
 The phenomenological story I’ve sketched so far involves moving from the kind 
of sensitivity to environmental norms that is involved in skillful absorbed coping to the 
kind of detached experience of an independent world that one can have when one is 
paying attention to it.  In the metaphor from the introduction, it involves the 
crystallization of self and world.  This movement, of course, is one that is familiar 
already from Being and Time.  But it is worth pointing out that the way of making the 
movement that I’ve proposed here is not the familiar one.  For the Heidegger of Being 
and Time it is the world that normally acts to push me out of absorbedly coping with it.  
The movement from readiness-to-hand to unreadiness-to-hand, for example, always 
occurs as a result of breakdowns that occur in the environment.  The hammer is too heavy 
for the task, the pen no longer writes, the keys aren’t available, and so on.   Now, it is 
certainly true that when the world fails to cooperate I can no longer cope with it 
absorbedly.  But the source of the movement in the story as I have told it not the world 
but the coping agent himself.  That is why this is a story about human freedom, rather 
than a story about worldly breakdown.  The movement from absorbed coping to attentive 
observation is the same, but the source of the movement is us rather than the world. 
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 Still, it is not quite right to say that I am the source in any traditional sense.  For 
the examples we have in mind are all examples in which we move from immediately 
being motivated to act by environmental solicitations to noticing that we are being so 
motivated.  And this kind of noticing is not, strictly speaking, something that I can do.  
That is because in motivated agency there is no I to do the noticing.  What we are 
considering is something like the birth of the self, and the self can’t be implicated in its 
own conception.  To see this point more clearly, think of the phenomenology of 
movement.  Thinking about the phenomenology of these kinds of transitions one can only 
say that one notices, not that one decides to or chooses to notice; indeed, perhaps all that 
one can say is that all of a sudden I find myself noticing my activity and the environment 
towards which it is directed.  It is as if the noticing is given to one from nowhere, created 
ex nihilo, just as the breakdown in the environment was.  There is no experienced source 
of a breakdown – the pen just stops working.  So too there is nobody who decides to 
notice, just noticing being given to one.  Only after the movement has been made out of 
motivated agency is there any sense in talking about someone who decides to act.   
 
 Heidegger does talk about our freely choosing to be bound by the environment, 
but again I think he means something merely negative here.  My experience of 
environmental norms is always such that resistance could occur, and this differentiates 
me from the animals.  And to the extent that the norms continue to hold me, there is a 
sense in which I have allowed them to do so.  But this is an extremely attenuated account 
of free choice.  The freedom I have in choosing to be bound by the environment is merely 
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the freedom involved in being the kind of being to whom it could be given that I find 
myself no longer being bound.  The picture one ends up with, then, is one in which our 
spontaneity, our freedom, is in the most basic case completely outside our control.  But 
because we are the kinds of beings to whom this freedom is sometimes given, we are not 
only responsive to the world’s demands, but also capable of seeing them as such. 
 
